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1.    Introduction 
 
  Investment banking practices recently have become the subject of intensifying 
scrutiny from regulators and the investment community, each of which has raised 
questions  concerning the efficacy of certain advisory services offered by investment 
banks – specifically, fairness opinions. This scrutiny largely has been based on anecdotal 
observations.
1 This article provides empirical evidence germane to those questions.  We 
explain why and how fairness opinions are rendered, and how target companies pay 
investment banks for this advisory service.  We explore potential incentive problems 
associated with the structure of investment banker fees and other potential conflicts of 
interest on the part of the investment banker from an empirical perspective.   In so doing, 
we construct a new database on firm and deal characteristics for friendly, two-step cash 
acquisitions. Our data measure characteristics of target firms and transactions, fees paid 
to  investment bankers, and premia paid to shareholders of the target company in 
connection with the acquisition, and explore the connections among these variables to 
cast light on this neglected area of corporate finance.  
We consider empirical implications of the views expressed by both the critics and 
the defenders of investment banking practices relating to the provision of fairness 
opinions. We analyze the determinants of investment bank fees and acquisition premia. 
We find no evidence in support of the view that the typical investment bank fee structure 
engenders conflicts of interest detrimental to the target shareholders. Nor do we find any 
                                                 
1 See, e.g, Wall Street Journal, December 29, 2004 summarizing the popular criticisms leveled at fairness 
opinions and observing that the investment banks that render the fairness opinion are often the advisors 
who arranged the transaction in the first instance and whose fees depend on the successful consummation 
of the transaction.  See also Bebchuk and Kahan (1989) noting that fairness opinions are “problematic” 
because investment banks have “substantial discretion in rendering such opinions” and the conflicts of 
interest faced by the investment bank “lead them to use their discretion to render pro-management fairness 
opinions.”   3 
evidence consistent with the view that bank advisory services to target firms are 
adversely affected by pre-existing business relationships between bankers and would-be 
acquirors. Furthermore, our analysis of variation in fees and acquisition premia indicates, 
among other things, that (1) the variation in fees paid to investment banks by target firms 
reflects differences in the fundamental costs of valuing targets, and (2) the variation in 
acquisition premia paid to target shareholders reflects target and transaction 
characteristics. With respect to the latter, target characteristics include volatility, 
leverage, and possibly other transaction characteristics that are less significant 
statistically, including the existence of employment contracts entered into by acquirors to 
retain target firm management (which are associated with higher acquisition premia).
2       
 
  1.1  What is a fairness opinion? Why and how are they rendered? 
When a public company is the target in an acquisition scenario, the target 
company’s board of directors commonly will engage the services of a financial advisor –  
generally, an investment bank.  In connection with this retention, the board of directors of 
the target company and the investment bank execute an engagement letter.  The 
engagement letter delineates, among other things, (a) the services the investment bank 
will provide to the board of directors on behalf of the target company in connection with 
a proposed transaction and (b) the amount and terms of payment of the fee for such 
services.   
  Typically, one of the services offered by an investment bank is an opinion as to 
the fairness to the target shareholders, from a financial point of view, of the transaction 
                                                 
2 Our paper does not address the effects of “golden parachutes” that the target company had in place prior 
to consummation of the transaction.    4 
proposed to be undertaken by the target board of directors (a “fairness opinion”).  
Fairness opinions share several important characteristics.  First, the fairness opinion is 
issued in the form of a letter addressed to the target board of directors and is filed as an 
exhibit to the relevant Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) filings made by the 
target in connection with the proposed transaction.  Second, the fairness opinion is dated 
as of the date it is rendered to the target board of directors (generally the date the target 
board of directors holds its meeting to vote on the proposed transaction) and speaks only 
as of such date with no duty (unless the engagement letter specifically provides 
otherwise) on the part of the investment bank to update (“bring-down”) the opinion to a 
later date.  Third, the fairness opinion speaks only to the fairness of the transaction from 
“a financial point of view” and does not (a) opine that the consideration to be received by 
the target shareholders in the proposed transaction represents the highest or best price 
available; (b) address the merits of the transaction or the decision of the board of 
directors of the target to proceed with the transaction, relative to other possible business 
strategies; or (c) assume any responsibility for independent verification of the publicly 
available information respecting the target or the information furnished by the 
management of the target to the investment bank in connection with its valuation.  
Finally, the fairness opinion addressed to the target board of directors expressly states 
that it does not constitute a recommendation to the target shareholders with respect to the 
actions necessary to be undertaken by such shareholders for the consummation of the 
proposed transaction.   
  Despite the lack of any legal imperative, virtually all boards of directors of public 
target companies secure fairness opinions before proceeding with a transaction.  The   5 
basis of securing such fairness opinions is traced by many back to the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).  Under the 
reasoning of Van Gorkom and state statutory authority, including Delaware (8 Del. C. § 
141(e)) providing that boards of directors may rely on professional opinions of others 
assuming such reliance is reasonable, the fairness opinion may serve as evidence that the 
board of directors has fulfilled its fiduciary duty of care in assessing the financial terms 
of the proposed transaction.   
 
  1.2  How do targets pay for fairness opinions? 
  The fee paid by the target company to the investment bank in connection with a 
tender offer may be found in Item 5 of the Solicitation/Recommendation Statement on 
Schedule 14D-9 (“Schedule 14D-9”) filed by the target with the SEC.  The fee to be paid 
to the investment bank frequently is (a) expressed as a percentage of the overall value of 
the transaction (defined as the value paid by the acquiror for the equity of the target plus 
the value of the liabilities assumed) and (b) payable upon the consummation of the 
transaction (referred to herein as a “Contingent Fee”).  In certain instances, the target 
board of directors may agree to pay the investment bank a fee irrespective of whether the 
transaction is consummated, which fee would typically represent a small portion of the 
total fee payable if a transaction were consummated, but may on occasion be the only fee 
payable to the investment bank.  These non-contingent fees may be in the nature of a 
retainer fee payable either upon execution of the engagement letter or over a period of 
months during which the investment bank is retained by the target (a “Retainer Fee”) or 
an opinion fee payable when the investment bank is prepared to render a fairness opinion   6 
with respect to the proposed transaction (an “Opinion Fee”). The Retainer and Opinion 
Fees collectively will be referred to herein as “Fixed Fees.”  As noted above, as a 
percentage of overall transaction value, Fixed Fees generally are much smaller than 
Contingent Fees and accordingly, an investment bank earning a Contingent Fee stands to 
make considerably more fee income if the transaction is consummated.  Contingent Fees 
are often referred to in the investment banking industry as “Success Fees.”   In certain 
instances where the engagement letter provides for a Fixed Fee in addition to the 
Contingent Fee, the Fixed Fee (to the extent previously paid to the investment bank) may 
be creditable against the Contingent Fee.   
  There are three common forms of Contingent Fee arrangements:  (1) contingent 
payment expressed as a constant percentage of the overall transaction value (a “Constant 
Percentage Fee”); (2) contingent payment expressed as an aggregate dollar amount that 
does not vary based on the size of the transaction (“Constant Dollar Fee”) and (3) 
contingent payment expressed as a sliding scale percentage based on the size of the 
transaction (“Variable Percentage Fee”).  In the sale of a target company, the most 
common form of Contingent Fee is the Constant Percentage Fee.  The Variable 
Percentage Fee is less common and generally limited to smaller or private company 
transactions.  The Constant Dollar Fee is a more common fee arrangement for the 
investment banker to the acquiror inasmuch as, the acquiror may not wish to “reward” its 
investment banker in the form of a higher cash fee as the purchase price to be paid by the 
acquiror increases.  
Investment banker fees in merger and acquisition transactions are highly 
negotiable. As we will show in Section 2 below, fee amounts vary considerably.  An   7 
investment bank may “pitch” its services to the target board of directors based on, among 
other things, the investment bank’s M&A experience both generally and in the target’s 
industry.  M&A “league tables” ranking investment banks based on their participation in 
announced M&A transactions over a given period are often employed for this purpose.  
Ultimately, the target board of directors will pay the investment bank based on the target 
board’s perception of the value the investment banker will deliver to the board of the 
target in connection with the transaction.
 3    In this regard, the then co-head of global 
mergers and acquisitions at Credit Suisse First Boston observed, “It is not just the deal 
assignments per se, but the quality of your role that is driving your fees.”   Wall Street 
Journal, December 11, 2003.  
 
  1.3  Contingent fees: conflict or alignment of interests?                   
  The fact that investment banks typically are paid the bulk of the fee upon 
consummation of a transaction has been criticized by some observers as potentially 
giving rise to a conflict of interest between the investment bank and its client - the target 
board of directors.  According to what we will call the “jaundiced” view of Contingent 
Fees, making fees contingent on consummation of the transaction (and by extension the 
rendering of a fairness opinion as a de facto pre-condition to consummation of a 
transaction) encourages the investment banker to “do what it takes” to opine favorably as 
to the fairness of the proposed transaction, in order to receive contingent compensation.  
                                                 
3 See also comments of a former general counsel of an investment bank observing that the banker’s fee 
“exorbitant or reasonable” is the product of many factors, including size and importance of the transaction, 
and “the benefits the company-client perceives or, with persuasion, can be made to perceive it is receiving.”  
Panel Discussion Chaired by Arthur H. Rosenbloom (Spring 1991).      8 
In determining whether to address this concern from a regulatory perspective, on 
November 11, 2004, the NASD issued Notice to Members 04-83-Request for Comment 
on Whether to Propose New Rule That Would Address Conflicts of Interest When 
Members Provide Fairness Opinions in Corporate Control Transactions (“NASD Notice 
04-83”).  In response to the NASD’s request for comment on the proposal, one prominent 
activist institutional investor observed that the contingent fee structure creates a “very 
large incentive for an investment bank to find that a transaction is fair regardless of the 
circumstances, when the bank will receive the bulk of its fee only if the transaction is 
successful” (Response of California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CALPERS), 
dated February 1, 2005 to NASD Notice 04-83).  Another response cast doubt on “how 
any board of directors can rely on a fairness opinion provided by an investment bank 
when the lion’s share of that bank’s fee is contingent on the underlying transaction 
closing.”  (Response of American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (“AFLCIO”), dated January 10, 2005 to NASD Notice 04-83).   
Additional causes for concern about the objectivity, and therefore, the utility of 
fairness opinions have been raised.  For example, an investment bank may favorably 
opine on an otherwise financially inadequate offer based on a desire to please the would-
be acquiror of the target because the ultimate acquiror of the target will be in a position to 
offer the target’s investment banker additional fee generating transactions.  Moreover, the 
existence of a pre-existing relationship between the would-be acquiror and the target’s 
investment bank further could serve to cloud the objectivity of the investment bank as it 
renders its fairness opinion.   9 
Despite the foregoing, there are powerful arguments that weigh against what we 
have called the “jaundiced” view of fairness opinions.  According to the alternative 
“benign” view, Contingent Fees that are proportional to the value of the acquisition serve 
to align the incentives of the investment banker with its client since the higher the price 
paid by the acquiror the higher the fee received by the investment bank.  Accordingly, 
investment banks have an incentive to advise against accepting financially inadequate 
offers if the investment banks are able to share in the gains produced by accepting higher 
offers.  
Furthermore, the critical positions expressed by CALPERS and the AFLCIO, 
while commonly echoed by commentators and the popular press, fail to take into account 
other important practical considerations.  First, experience shows that the Contingent Fee 
structure typically is the preferred structure chosen by target boards of directors, who 
should seek to align the interests of the investment banker with those of the shareholders 
(See Response of each of The Association of the Bar of the City of New York (the 
“ABA”), dated February 1, 2005 and Securities Industry Association, dated February 1, 
2005 to NASD Notice 04-83).   
Second, investment banks bear reputational and legal risks when offering fairness 
opinions.  An investment bank that routinely opines favorably on an otherwise financially 
inadequate offer will find it hard to attract future clients, and runs the risk of lawsuits.  
Third, an otherwise financially inadequate transaction that collapses under 
shareholder opposition after the fairness opinion is rendered (generally at the meeting of 
the board of directors where the board votes on whether to proceed with the proposed 
transaction) will generate no contingent fees for the investment banker.     10 
Finally, the fact that the publicly observed fairness opinions are typically 
favorable ignores the unobservable but real world iterative process involved in rendering 
a fairness opinion and does not imply that favorable opinions are rendered with that same 
high frequency.  The head of mergers and acquisitions at a major law firm framed the 
issue plainly stating that “[t]he reason you don’t see unfairness opinions is that those 
deals won’t get done.”  Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2005.  In practice, if the banker 
is having difficulty reaching a favorable conclusion as to the fairness of the transaction 
from a financial point of view, the banker will alert the board to this fact in advance of 
the board meeting and “those transactions are typically either renegotiated or abandoned 
[and] [f]or obvious reasons, this occurs much more frequently than is generally known or 
apparent.”  (Response of the ABA, dated February 1, 2005 to NASD Notice 04-83).   
   
1.4  “Testing” the jaundiced and benign views of fairness opinions. 
Our empirical analysis does not purport to construct a full-blown structural model 
of investment banker fees or target acquisition premia.  Instead, we perform simple 
means comparisons and regression analyses to measure whether patterns of association in 
the data appear to be more consistent with the implications of the benign or the jaundiced 
views.  
We focus on six categories of empirical implications of the benign and jaundiced 
views of fairness opinions, as set forth below.  
First, according to the benign view, the amount of fees paid to the investment bank 
should reflect the difficulty of processing information about the target necessary for the 
bank to form a view as to the valuation of the target and the likelihood of an ultimately   11 
successful sale transaction.  Consequently, according to the benign view, investment 
banker fees should increase with attributes of the firm or the transaction that make it 
inherently more difficult to make such an assessment of the target.  Those information-
cost attributes include the (a) timing of the transaction (e.g., targets in industries whose 
stock performance exceeds the broader market are easier to sell); (b) attributes of the 
target (e.g., firms perceived by the market to be high risk are harder to value); and (c) 
prior relationship between the target and the investment bank (e.g., firms well-known to 
the investment banker are easier to value). 
Second, according to the benign view, transactions that are perceived to be more 
complicated to complete (involving multiple bidders or an auction process) should 
command a higher fee. 
Third, according to the benign view, because of the risks borne by investment 
bankers from Contingent Fees, the greater the proportion of the fee that is contingent, the 
greater the amount of the fee.  
Fourth, according to the benign view, acquisition premia reflect the franchise 
value of the target, including both its tangible and intangible assets.  
Fifth, according to the jaundiced view, transactions where a greater proportion of 
investment banker fees are fixed (as opposed to contingent) should, on average, display 
higher acquisition premia (since, according to the jaundiced view, Contingent Fee 
structures encourage investment banks to permit otherwise financially inadequate deals to 
go forward).  
Sixth, according to the jaundiced view, a prior relationship between the 
investment bank and the acquiror should result in a lower acquisition premium, holding   12 
other factors constant.  In contrast, according to the benign view, the acquisition premium 
should reflect the fundamental attributes of the target and the transaction, not the 
structure of the investment banker fee or any prior relationship between the investment 
bank and the acquiror. 
 The remainder of our paper explores these six implications of the benign and 
jaundiced views, first from the perspective of simple differences in means, and second, 
from the perspective of regression analyses. Section 2 discusses the construction of our 
dataset, the definitions of the variables employed in our analysis, and summary statistics.  
Section 3 presents our regression findings. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.    Data     
  2.1  Sample 
We examine transactions in excess of $100 million in value, which were 
announced between 1994 and 2002 and completed, where the consideration was solely 
cash, and where the acquisition was effected pursuant to a friendly, two-step transaction.   
We focus on cash transactions because in such situations the evaluation of the 
consideration received by the target shareholders is clearly known ex ante.  In a cash 
transaction the target shareholders will not share in any of the “upside” of the ultimate 
merger as could be argued they would in the case where the target shareholders receive 
stock of the acquiror.   
A friendly, two-step transaction is a transaction approved by the target board of 
directors pursuant to a first-step tender offer (wherein the acquiror tenders for all, or a 
number of target shares sufficient for the acquiror to effect a subsequent merger of the   13 
target into an acquisition subsidiary of the acquiror, whereby the target becomes a wholly 
owned subsidiary of the acquiror), and a second-step merger between the target and the 
acquisition subsidiary.  We focus on friendly, two-step transactions because that structure 
generally minimizes the time from announcement to consummation of the transaction. 
The greater speed of consummation reflects the fact that the acquiror does not need target 
shareholder approval for the second-step merger.  This feature of friendly, two-step 
transactions obviates to a great extent the potential concern over the “staleness” of an 
investment banker’s fairness opinion at the time the target shareholders tender their 
shares pursuant to the offer.  
  The transactions in the sample were identified based on information set forth in 
the database of Securities Data Company (“SDC”).  To be included in the sample, the 
transaction needed to satisfy the following criteria: 
(1)  The transaction was announced between 1994 and 2002 and completed. 
(2) The target was a U.S. public company. 
(3)  The transaction value was in excess of $100 million. 
(4)  The consideration paid to the target shareholders pursuant to the tender offer 
consisted solely of cash and the transaction was effectuated pursuant to a friendly two-
step deal. 
(5)  The transaction was not a (a) “going private transaction” within the meaning of Rule 
13e-3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; (b) management buy-in or 
management buy-out or (c) leveraged buy-out. 
(6) The target company had the following SEC filings available on Edgar: (a) Schedule 
14D-9; (b) Schedule 14F and (c) Proxy Statement for the regularly scheduled annual   14 
meeting of the target shareholders for the most recent meeting of target shareholders 
before the consummation of the transaction.  
All calculations of the fee payments to the investment banker were based on the 
fee information reported in Item 5 of the target company’s Schedule 14D-9 and SDC 
data.  The acquisition premia for the 170 transaction observations were as reported by 
SDC and calculated as the per share offer price for the target equity divided by the stock 
price of the target four weeks prior to the announcement of the transaction minus one.   
  Application of the above selection criteria yielded a sample of 170 transactions.  
For each of the transactions so identified, information on a number of attributes of the 
transaction was obtained, as described in the Table [2.1].   Table [2.1] also provides the 
labels for the regressors used in the tables that report summary statistics in the remainder 
of Section 2, and in the investment bank fee (IBFEE) and acquisition premium 
(ACQPREM) regression models reported in Section 3.    15 
Table 2.1:  Regressor Definitions 
Variable  Variable 
Designation 
Description 
Acquisition Premium offered by 
Acquiror to Target Shareholders  
ACQPREM  Per share offer price for target equity divided by the stock price of the 
target four weeks prior to announcement of transaction minus one. 
Fee paid by Target’s Board of 
Directors to Target’s Investment 
Banker 
IBFEE  Target investment banker’s fee computed as a percent of total 
transaction value (amount paid for target equity plus assumed liabilities 
as computed by SDC) based on information in target’s Schedule 14D-9 
and SDC.  
Size of Target   Ln(Size)  Natural log of the total assets of the target as reported by SDC. 
No Solicitation Language in 
Banker Fairness Opinion 
NoSolicitation  Dummy variable based on text of banker’s fairness opinion in Schedule 
14D-9.  Variable takes a value of 1 if the investment bank fairness 
opinion states banker did not solicit bids; otherwise variable takes a 
value of 0. 
Nature of  Sale Process 
Preceding Consummation of 
Transaction 
ModeSale  Dummy variable based on disclosure in target’s Schedule 14D-9.  
Variable takes a value of 1 if either an auction took place or the target 
received multiple indications of interest during the course of the 
transaction; otherwise variable takes a value of 0.   
M&A Market Share of Target 
Investment Banker 
IB_Rank  Target investment banker’s three-year average M&A advisor ranking as 
reported by Investment Dealers Digest for the three-year period prior to 
the transaction with lower numerical rankings implying a greater M&A 
market share. 
Volatility of Target Stock Price  Vol  Volatility of target stock price returns based on latest twelve months 
prior to the transaction announcement. 
Performance of Industry of 
which Target is a Member  
PeerBroad  Most recent indexed performance of target’s peer group of stocks 
divided by indexed performance of a broad index over the same period 
as set forth in the target’s most recent proxy statement or Schedule 14f. 
Prior Relationship of Target’s 
Investment Banker with ultimate 
Acquiror of Target 
IBOthBus(Acquiror)  Dummy variable based on disclosure in target’s Schedule 14D-9.  
Variable takes a value of 1 if target’s investment banker had a prior 
relationship with the acquiror; otherwise variable takes a value of 0. 
Prior Relationship of Target’s 
Investment Banker with Target 
IBOthBus(Target)  Dummy variable based on disclosure in target’s Schedule 14D-9.  
Variable takes a value of 1 if target’s investment banker had a prior 
relationship with the target; otherwise variable takes a value of 0.   
Bonus Payments to Target 
Management in connection with 
Sale Process 
Bonus  Dummy variable based on disclosure in target’s Schedule 14D-9 or 
Schedule 14f.  Variable takes a value of 1 if management received a 
bonus payment (excluding payments pursuant to existing Golden 
Parachutes) related to consummation of a transaction; otherwise variable 
takes a value of  0. 
Contracts Entered into by the 
Acquiror with Target 
Management in connection with 
the Transaction 
EmpContr  Dummy variable based on disclosure in target’s Schedule 14D-9 or 
Schedule 14f.  Variable takes a value of 1 if acquiror entered into an 
employment contract with target management as part of the transaction; 
otherwise variable takes a value of  0. 
Proportion of Leverage in the 
Target’s Capital Structure 
Leverage  Ratio of debt to total capitalization of the target based on market value 
of the target’s equity four weeks prior to the transaction and implied 
debt of the target as reported by SDC.  
Significant non-Officer/Director 
Shareholders of Target  
Non-O/D_w/5%  Number of 5% beneficial equity holders of the target who are not 
officers or directors of the target as disclosed in target’s most recent 
proxy statement or Schedule 14f. 
Officer and Director Equity 
Ownership of Target 
O/D_Oship  Percentage of target equity beneficially owned by target’s officers and 
directors as disclosed in target’s most recent proxy statement or 
Schedule 14f.  
Target Shareholder support for 
Transaction  
ShrhAgmt  Dummy variable based on disclosure in target’s Schedule 14D-9.  
Variable takes a value of 1 if target shareholders have entered into a 
voting agreement with acquiror in support of the transaction; otherwise 
variable takes a value of 0. 
Percent of the Target Investment 
Banker Fee that is Non-
contingent 
FixedFee_Pct  Percentage of the target investment banker’s fee that is not contingent 
on the outcome of the transaction, includes retainer fee plus any fairness 
opinion fee each as set forth in Schedule 14D-9. 
M&A Market Activity Levels  MarkAct  Level of dollar volume worldwide announced M&A activity for the 
transaction year divided by corresponding level of M&A activity in 
1994. 
Residual of the Fee Equation  IBFee_Res  Regression residual from equation 4 in Table [3.2]   16 
 
  2.2 Summary statistics 
  We divide the summary statistics into three categories of variables, which are 
organized by transaction value:  (1) information about investment banker fees (IBFEE) 
and acquisition premia (ACQPREM) are described in Table [2.2a]; (2) target 
characteristics appear in Table [2.2b]; and (3) transaction characteristics are reported in 
Table [2.2c]. 
 



















170  36  29  33  31  19  22 
Fee Dollar Amount 
($MM) mean 
$4.24  $1.50  $2.22  $2.76  $3.94  $6.44  $12.15 
   Min  $0.15  $0.15  $0.20  $1.22  $0.55  $1.00  $4.00 
   Max  $25.21  $3.20  $5.30  $4.50  $8.87  $19.30  $25.21 
   Standard Dev  4.46  0.78  1.31  0.81  2.01  3.74  6.80 
IBFEE mean  1.04%  1.17%  1.27%  1.17%  0.97%  0.88%  0.56% 
   Min  0.12%  0.13%  0.12%  0.59%  0.16%  0.18%  0.18% 
   Max  2.90%  2.47%  2.90%  2.14%  2.00%  1.94%  1.71% 
   Standard Dev  0.55  0.61  0.71  0.35  0.47  0.39  0.29 
ACQPREM mean  54.60%  49.87%  63.10%  56.99%  56.74%  45.30%  52.59% 
   Min  -16.19%  -16.19%  9.89%  0.00%  9.47%  4.23%  9.38% 
   Max  336.36%  200.00%  124.26%  336.36%  264.08%  101.60%  117.80% 
   Standard Dev  40.86  41.55  31.22  57.12  43.54  28.22  25.70 
 
  In Table [2.2a], the mean IBFEE is higher for smaller transactions. That finding is 
consistent with Calomiris and Himmelberg (2004), and others, who find that investment 
banking fees for securities offerings tend to be higher for smaller, riskier firms, and also 
reflects a minimum fee charged by investment bankers on any transaction.  Inasmuch as 
in the acquisition context the fee is expressed as a percentage of transaction value, higher   17 
Fee Dollar Amount increases with transaction size.  While the mean ACQPREM varies 
by target category, its standard deviation is much lower for the largest target categories. 
Table [2.2b] shows that the largest transactions understandably involve the largest 
firms, and that the volatility of stock price returns tends to be lower for the largest firms.  
Large firms also tend to show fewer transactions where block shareholders other than 
officers and directors own large stakes in the firm, a fact that reflects the higher costs of 
foregoing diversification when holding a substantial share of a large firm. Across most 
categories of transaction value targets tended to be in industries whose stocks generally 
performed at least as well as the broader market, with the smallest firms exhibiting the 
lowest standard deviation.  



















170  36  29  33  31  19  22 
Size ($MM) mean  $320.42  $89.40  $122.06  $168.91  $236.71  $490.94  $1,157.88 
   Min  $7.30  $7.30  $40.50  $32.40  $15.10  $45.50  $176.00 
   Max  $3,060.40  $268.90  $362.40  $1,050.10  $1,078.00  $1,999.20  $3,060.40 
   Standard Dev  505.36  52.45  74.87  175.95  235.65  483.28  873.63 
Vol mean  0.64  0.64  0.69  0.64  0.67  0.58  0.60 
   Min  0.17  0.29  0.27  0.31  0.20  0.17  0.19 
   Max  1.63  1.42  1.46  1.33  1.63  1.20  1.50 
   Standard Dev  0.26  0.23  0.30  0.22  0.28  0.25  0.30 
Leverage mean  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.11  0.12  0.16  0.14 
   Min  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
   Max  0.92  0.65  0.49  0.92  0.60  0.76  0.65 
   Standard Dev  0.18  0.16  0.15  0.19  0.19  0.21  0.17 
PeerBroad mean  0.99  0.90  0.94  0.91  1.10  0.85  1.27 
   Min  0.13  0.33  0.13  0.29  0.49  0.23  0.46 
   Max  3.04  2.51  2.07  1.85  3.04  1.44  2.90 
   Standard Dev  0.49  0.42  0.43  0.40  0.55  0.35  0.71 
Non-O/D _w/5% mean  2.49  3.25  2.79  2.33  2.06  2.05  2.05 
   Min  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
   Max  7  6  7  7  4  4  5 
   Standard Dev  1.57  1.59  1.72  1.63  1.39  1.18  1.40 
O/D_Oship mean  19.28%  25.44%  20.30%  19.39%  22.40%  13.20%  8.51% 
   Min  0.00%  1.10%  1.10%  0.00%  1.20%  2.60%  1.00% 
   Max  81.70%  79.80%  73.30%  60.50%  81.70%  37.57%  40.86% 
   Standard Dev  17.86  19.58  17.22  17.20  22.19  9.13  8.49   18 
Table [2.2c] reports transaction characteristics of targets.  In 102 of the 170 
observations, either an auction was employed or multiple indications of interest were 
received (ModeSale=1). Clearly, in many cases there are multiple potential bidders for a 
target.  That fact is significant for our analysis since, as discussed in Section 1, the 
potential for more than one bidder gives the investment banker receiving a Contingent 
Fee a greater incentive not to render a fairness opinion with respect to an otherwise 
financially inadequate offer. In 31 of the 170 transactions, the opinion of the investment 
bank indicated that the investment bank did not solicit additional bids (NoSolicitation=1). 
 
Table 2.2c:  Transaction Characteristics 
Variable/Sample 
Statistics 












ModeSale   102  68  55.04%  53.94%  47.86/(4.74)  27.54/(3.34) 
NoSolicitation  31  139  53.17%  54.92%  27.71/(4.98)  43.33/(3.68) 
IBOthBus(Acquiror)   30  140  53.42%  54.85%  29.96/(5.47)  42.92/(3.63) 
IBOthBus(Target)   28  142  58.03%  53.93%  26.83/(5.07)  43.14/(3.62) 
Bonus  24  146  57.21%  54.17%  21.41/(4.37)  43.27/(3.58) 
EmpContr  80  90  61.14%  48.80%  50.29/(5.62)  29.21/(3.08) 
ShrhAgmt  105  65  57.95%  49.20%  42.14/(4.11)  38.42/(4.77) 
FixedFee_Pct  53  65  50.54%  58.86%  51.80/(7.12)  37.46/(4.65) 














170  36  29  33  31  19  22 
IB_Rank mean  11.96  14.86  14.28  12.23  12.58  10.34  4.27 
   Min  1.00  1.33  1.33  1.33  1.00  1.33  1.33 
   Max  20.00  20.00  20.00  20.00  20.00  20.00  15.67 
   Standard Dev  7.45  6.93  7.16  7.41  7.09  6.85  4.07 
 
 
Notes:  N=1 indicates transaction observations possessing characteristic noted and N=0 indicates transaction 
observations lacking characteristic noted.  In the case of FixedFee_Pct and Fixed_Pct_ExAnte,  N=1 is the 53 
observations with the highest FixedFee_Pct and N=0 is the 65 observations with zero fixed fees. Fixed_Pct_ExAnte is 
calculated as the ratio of the fixed part of investment bank’s fee relative to the total fee, assuming that the acquisition 
value equals the pre-acquisition value of the target plus the sample average acquisition premium. 
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Some deal attributes are associated with economically large differences in mean 
acquisition premia shown in Table [2.2c.], but only one of these differences is highly 
significant statistically. Transactions in which target managers entered into an 
employment contract with the acquiror in connection with the transaction display higher 
acquisition premia (61.14% compared with 48.80%). This mean difference is statistically 
significant at the 2.8% level (for a one-tailed test). In contrast, differences in mean 
acquisition premia in transactions in which target managers received a bonus payment 
from the target company (other than golden parachute payments) related to successful 
consummation of transaction are neither economically large (57.21% compared with 
54.17%) nor statistically significant. Greater target shareholder support as evidenced by 
the existence of a shareholder agreement is associated with a higher acquisition premium 
(57.95% compared with 49.20%), but this mean difference is less statistically significant 
(at the 8.3% level for a one-tailed test).  
The FixedFee_Pct variable is defined as the percentage of the target investment 
banker’s fee that is not contingent on the outcome of the transaction.  Details regarding 
the distribution of this variable appear in Table [2.2d], which divides the sample 
(roughly) into three terciles according to the degree of fixity of the fee (65 firms with no 
fixity, and the remaining 105 firms divided into 52 middling-fixity firms and 53 high-
fixity firms). Transactions in the upper tercile of the fixity of investment banker fees (the 
top 53 firms measured according to FixedFee_Percent) tend to show lower acquisition 
premia, but this difference relative to the mean for firms with zero fixity is not 
statistically significant. Differences in mean acquisition premia related to prior 
relationships between the investment bank and the target or acquiror are not statistically   20 
significant and in the case of the existence of a prior relationship with the acquiror the 
mean acquisition premium difference is less than 2.0%.  
The statistically insignificant mean difference for FixedFee_Percent is opposite in 
sign to the difference implied by the jaundiced view, and we can think of no explanation 
for this observed difference. When we redefine the FixedFee_Percent variable using an 
ex ante measure (i.e., Fixed_Pct_ExAnte, which removes the effect of unanticipatedly 
high acquisition premia on the measured ratio), the difference in the means is 
substantially reduced.
4 That finding indicates that the statistically insignificant difference 
in acquisition premia for deals with different FixedFee_Percent reported in Table [2.2c] 
may reflect correlation by construction, given that the denominator of the 
FixedFee_Percent variable is a positive function of the acquisition premium.   
The simple differences in means shown in Table [2.2c] do not control for other 
attributes of targets or transactions (something we explore in the regression analysis in 
Section 3), and they are not necessarily indicative of causal relationships.  Nevertheless, 
despite these limitations, the facts about mean differences suggest two important things: 
(a) on average, greater fixity in investment banker fees is not associated with higher 
acquisition premia (contrary to the jaundiced view), and (b) there are interesting patterns 
of association relating transactions and target characteristics to IBFEE and ACQPREM. 
Section 3 explores those patterns of association in the context of simple regression 
analyses. 
                                                 
4 Fixed_Pct_ExAnte is calculated as the ratio of the fixed part of investment bank’s fee relative to the total 
fee, assuming that the acquisition value equals the pre-acquisition value of the target plus the sample 
average acquisition premium. Details on the distribution of Fixed_Pct_ExAnte are provided in Table  
[2.2e].   21 
   Table [2.2d]:  Investment Banker Fee Structure 








Number of Deals  170  65  52  53 
Retainer + Opn Fee   mean 
       Total Fee 
15.75%  0.00%  8.77%  41.90% 
   Min  0.00%  0.00%  0.68%  17.24% 
   Max  100.00%  0.00%  17.05%  100.00% 
   Standard Dev  0.24  0.00  0.05  0.28 
FixedFee Fee Dollar 
Amount ($MM) mean 
$0.36  $0.00  $0.36  $0.79 
   Min  $0.00  $0.00  $0.04  $0.08 
   Max  $4.00  $0.00  $2.50  $4.00 
   Standard Dev  0.59  0.00  0.38  0.81 
Total Fees Dollar Amount 
($MM) mean 
$4.24  $5.05  $4.83  $2.69 
   Min  $0.15  $0.25  $0.88  $0.15 
   Max  $25.21  $25.21  $21.00  $23.00 
   Standard Dev  4.46  4.86  4.42  3.58 
Average Deal Size ($MM)  $553.33  $666.22  $524.98  $442.69 
   Min  $100.04  $119.88  $105.22  $100.04 
   Max  $5,602.99  $5,602.99  $3,840.94  $4,062.68 
   Standard Dev  818.74  969.11  722.20  694.21 
ACQPREM mean  54.60%  58.86%  53.42%  50.54% 
   Min  -16.19%  -16.19%  -13.92%  -6.80% 
   Max  336.36%  264.08%  117.80%  336.36% 
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Table [2.2e]:  Investment Banker Fee Structure 











Number of Deals  170  65  52  53 
Retainer + Opn Fee   mean 
       Total Fee 
15.75%  0.00%  9.05%  41.63% 
   Min  0.00%  0.00%  0.68%  13.23% 
   Max  100.00%  0.00%  22.73%  100.00% 
   Standard Dev  0.24  0.00  0.06  0.28 
FixedFee Fee Dollar 
Amount ($MM) mean 
$0.36  $0.00  $0.38  $0.77 
   Min  $0.00  $0.00  $0.04  $0.08 
   Max  $4.00  $0.00  $2.50  $4.00 
   Standard Dev  0.59  0.00  0.39  0.82 
Total Fees Dollar Amount 
($MM) mean 
$4.24  $5.05  $4.90  $2.62 
   Min  $0.15  $0.25  $0.88  $0.15 
   Max  $25.21  $25.21  $21.00  $23.00 
   Standard Dev  4.46  4.86  4.41  3.55 
Average Deal Size ($MM)  $553.33  $666.22  $549.68  $418.46 
   Min  $100.04  $119.88  $105.22  $100.04 
   Max  $5,602.99  $5,602.99  $3,840.94  $4,062.68 
   Standard Dev  818.74  969.11  725.37  687.14 
ACQPREM mean  54.60%  58.86%  48.20%  55.66% 
   Min  -16.19%  -16.19%  -13.92%  4.23% 
   Max  336.36%  264.08%  117.80%  336.36% 
   Standard Dev  40.86  37.46  31.39  51.65 
 
 
3.  Regression Analysis 
In Section 1.4, we developed six testable implications of the benign and jaundiced 
views. In Section 3, we construct simple regression models of IBFEE and ACQPREM to 
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Table 3.1: Predictions of Benign and Jaundiced Views 
  Benign View  Jaundiced View 
1. IBFEE reflects information cost  *   
2. Complicated transactions have higher IBFEE  *   
3. IBFEE falls as FixedFee_Percent rises  *   
4. ACQPREM reflects franchise value of target  *   
5. ACQPREM rises with FixedFee_Percent    * 
6. Relationship with acquiror reduces ACQPREM    * 
 
 
3.1  Determinants of the Investment Banker Fee (IBFEE)   
  In constructing a simple model that explains cross-sectional variation in IBFEE, 
we take into account various proxies for the influences referred to in the first three rows 
of Table [3.1].  Regression results are reported in Table [3.2]. 
  The definition of the dependent variable in Table [3.2] is a transformed version of 
IBFEE, which we label IBFEE_EXANTE.  This transformation of IBFEE uses the 
expected transaction value for the target rather than the actual transaction value in the 
denominator of the fee percentage calculation.  The expected transaction value simply 
adds the sample average of the acquisition premium (55%) to the pre-acquisition equity 
value of the target and adds the result to the implied book value of the target debt to 
arrive at the expected transaction value.  This transformation avoids spurious inferences 
about association between IBFEE and the regressors, which could result from a 
correlation between the error term in IBFEE (related to unpredictably high premia) and   24 
the regressors.  As discussed in Section 2, the percentage of fixed fee should be similarly 
adjusted to avoid spurious correlation; consequently, Fixed_Pct_ExAnte is the regressor 
used to capture the degree of fixity of fees.  We also ran the same regressions as reported 
in Table [3.2] without making these two ex ante adjustments and obtained very similar 
results.  
With respect to the first hypothesis in Table [3.1], as proxies for information cost 
specific to the target firm, we included firm asset size (modeled using a quadratic 
functional form), the volatility of stock price returns, leverage, and whether the target had 
a prior fee producing relationship with the investment bank.  IBFEE should be higher for 
targets that are small firms, firms with higher returns volatility, highly leveraged firms, 
and firms that have not had previous contact with the investment bank. PeerBroad is 
included to capture the effects of hot markets for a particular industry’s targets.  We 
anticipated that IBFEE should be lower for target’s in industries where the industry is 
outperforming the broader market.  
With respect to the second hypothesis, NoSolicitation is included, and we expect 
it to enter with a negative sign. That is, when an investment bank’s engagement does not 
entail the solicitation of additional bidders, the fee charged by the investment bank should 
be lower. 
With respect to the third hypothesis, FixedFee_Percent is expected to display a 
negative coefficient.  Note that the variable included in the regression is 
Fixed_Pct_ExAnte rather than FixedFee_Percent.  Fixed_Pct_ExAnte calculates the 
fixity percentage of the fee based on the expected transaction value rather than the actual 
transaction value for the target.    25 
We also included IBOtherBus(Acquiror) in the IBFEE_EXANTE regression, and 
IB_Rank, to investigate whether fees are related to the rank of the investment bank or the 
relationship between the acquiror and the target’s investment bank. To measure IB_Rank, 
we constructed a league table ranking for each investment bank.  Banks were assigned a 
rank (one through 20 with lower rankings associated with a greater participation by the 
bank in announced M&A transactions) based on the individual bank’s rank in announced 
M&A transactions as reported by Investment Dealers Digest.  Banks that did not appear 
on the Investment Dealers Digest league table for a given year were assigned a rank of 
20.  The rank so assigned for each year was then averaged over the three year period 
based on the three years prior to the announcement of the transaction.
5     
  We report five regression specifications in Table [3.2].  Our results for the IBFEE 
regressions support all three of the predictions of the benign view, although not all the 
variables included are highly statistically significant.    
Consistent with hypothesis one (the benign view), when evaluated over the range 
of our sample, asset size (in its quadratic form) is negatively related to investment 
banking fees. A similar result has been reported by McLaughlin (1990) in her work on 
investment banking contracts in tender offers.  McLaughlin analyzed all fees in tender 
offers for all types of transactions and for fees paid to target firm bankers over the period 
January 1980 to December 1985. McLaughlin reported (1) a mean fee as a percentage of 
transaction value of 0.77 with a standard deviation of 0.63, and (2) a mean fee expressed 
in dollars of $4.21 million with a standard deviation of 2.50.  Consistent with our findings 
                                                 
5 Sixteen observations in the sample reported multiple advisors to the target.  In these instances the average 
of the advisor ranks was used and the fee was based on the fee paid to all investment banks.  In certain of 
these sixteen observations an advisor may have been retained to render only an opinion –  what has been 
recently referred to as a “second opinion.”  See Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2005.  We ran our 
regression results removing these sixteen observations and obtained very similar results.   26 
in Table [3.2], McLaughlin also observed substantial cross-sectional variation in each 
category of offer value suggesting that there is substantial negotiation involved between 
the banker and the target firm in setting the fee.  In other words, size is not the only 
characteristic that matters; the banker does not use a simple “rate card” such as the so-
called “Lehman formula” wherein the fee is determined solely by a decreasing step 
function of the value of the transaction (e.g., 5%, 4%, 3%, 2%, or 1% of various 
increments in transaction value).   
   Similarly, leverage and volatility enter positively in the fee regression. Other 
business between the target and the bank has a negative effect on the fee, as predicted, 
but this effect is not highly statistically significant (with a significance level of roughly 
12 percent).  PeerBroad enters negatively, as predicted, and is highly statistically 
significant.  
  Consistent with hypothesis two (the benign view), NoSolicitation enters 
negatively.  Consistent with hypothesis three of the benign view, the degree of fixity of 
the fee is negatively related to the size of the fee, reflecting the compensation received by 
investment bankers in the form of a higher fee when their fee is riskier (i.e., more 
contingent). 
  IBOthBus(Acquiror) is small, negative, and statistically insignificant.  IB_Rank is 
negative and statistically significant.  Consistent with our expectation, an investment 
bank with more transaction experience (a lower rank) in the M&A field is able to 
command a higher premium for its services, all other factors held constant.     27 
 Table 3.2 
Investment Bank Fee (IBFEE_EXANTE) Regressions 
(Significance Levels in Parentheses) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
Constant  0.434  0.700  0.434  0.776  0.802 
  (0.482)  (0.260)  (0.484)  (0.211)  (0.198) 
 
Ln (Size)  0.402  0.395  0.402  0.357  0.355 
  (0.073)  (0.075)  (0.074)  (0.108)  (0.110) 
 
[Ln (Size)]
2  -0.053  -0.056  -0.053  -0.052  -0.051 
  (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
 
PeerBroad  -0.213  -0.232  -0.213  -0.226  -0.215 
  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
 
Vol  0.499  0.480  0.499  0.502  0.502 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
 
Leverage  0.582  0.659  0.581  0.625  0.609 
  (0.011)  (0.004)  (0.013)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
 
NoSolicitation  -0.301  -0.322  -0.302  -0.312  -0.328 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
 
Fixed_Pct_ExAnte  -0.801  -0.751  -0.802  -0.742  -0.759 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
 
IB_Rank    -0.012    -0.011  -0.013 
    (0.022)    (0.025)  (0.018) 
 
IBOthBus(Acquiror)      -0.004    -0.079 
      (0.965)    (0.428) 
 
IBOthBus(Target)        -0.140  -0.141 
        (0.130)  (0.126) 
 
Adj. R-Squared  0.369  0.385  0.365  0.390  0.389 
No. Obs.  170  170  170  170  170 
       
 
Notes: Dependent variable: IBFEE_EXANTE is the ratio of the investment bank’s fee relative to the pre-acquisition 
value of the target plus the sample average acquisition premium.   28 
3.2  Determinants of the Acquisition Premium 
  In constructing a simple model that explains cross-sectional variation in 
ACQPREM, we take into account various proxies for the influences referred to in the last 
three rows of Table [3.1], as well as a variety of control variables that previous literature 
suggests may be relevant for explaining acquisition premia.  Regression results are 
reported in Table [3.3]. 
  With respect to hypothesis four (benign view) in Table [3.1], we include 
EmpContr to measure the extent to which there is perceived franchise value to the target 
associated with the acquiror’s decision to contract to retain target management. 
  With respect to hypothesis five, we include Fixed_Pct_ExAnte. According to the 
jaundiced view, more fixity avoids conflicts of interest, and therefore, should result in 
higher acquisition premia, all else held constant. 
With respect to hypothesis six, IBOthBus(Acquiror) should enter negatively, 
since according to the jaundiced view, investment banks might be suborned by their 
contacts with acquirors, resulting in lower acquisition premia for targets. 
We also include several other control variables. Controls that were not included in 
the fee regressions include measures of the concentration of stock ownership, which we 
thought might be relevant for acquisition premia (since greater concentration might 
improve the bargaining power of target shareholders). Similarly, we include a dummy 
variable for the presence of a voting agreement between the acquiror and target 
shareholders, which should also reflect greater target bargaining power. 
With respect to hypothesis four, EmpContr enters positively and is large 
economically, but it is not highly statistically significant (with a significance level   29 
ranging between 12 and 15 percent). The Bonus variable, in contrast, is negative and 
statistically insignificant. Recall that EmpContr reflects the existence of a contractual 
agreement between the acquiror and target management, while Bonus reflects a payment 
from the target to its management in connection with the consummation of the 
transaction. These results indicate that payments to management, per se, do not affect 
shareholder value, but that payments to retain management are possibly value-increasing. 
This finding provides some support for the view that acquisition premia reflect, in part, 
the value of intangible assets of target firms. This finding also suggests that target firm 
shareholders may share in the gains that accrue to target management from preserving 
value-creating managerial capital.  
Neither of the two jaundiced-view hypotheses (five and six) receives support from 
the regression analysis of ACQPREM.  Both the degree of fixity of the investment 
banker’s fee, and the existence of a prior fee-producing business relationship between the 
acquiror and the target’s investment bank, are unrelated to the acquisition premium. 
Controls for volatility and leverage both entered positively in the acquisition 
premium regression. These variables could proxy for many influences (e.g., growth 
opportunities, more disciplined management) and are not amenable to clear 
interpretation. Interestingly, while none of the controls for target bargaining power  
(including the composition of shareholders, and the ShrhAgt variable) prove to be highly 
statistically significant, ShrhAgt and Non-O/D_w/5% are both positive and sometimes 
significant at levels of 13 or 14%, and the coefficient on ShrhAgt is large.  
ModeSale proved insignificant.  Of course, that does not imply that increased 
competition has no effect on the acquisition premium.  Rather, it may be explained by   30 
noting that ModeSale is an endogenous variable.  The desire on the part of the target to 
receive multiple bids itself results from an expectation that doing so will improve the 
outcome, and that improvement will be larger for some firms than for others. That 
endogeneity may have the effect of reducing the measured effect of ModeSale on the 
acquisition premium in our regressions; that is, ModeSale may be more likely to be 
positive when the target’s acquisition premium without ModeSale would be particularly 
low. 
Similarly, the fact that IBFEE_Res does not enter significantly in the ACQPREM 
regression should not be interpreted as evidence that spending more on investment 
banking services is worthless.  IBFEE is a highly endogenous variable. As in the case of 
ModeSale, its insignificance in the ACQPREM regression can be explained by the 
supposition that firms with large unexplained investment banking costs have 
unobservable attributes (i.e., information problems) that encourage them to spend more.     31 
Table 3.3 
Acquisition Premium (ACQPREM) Regressions 
 (Significance Levels in Parentheses) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
Constant  -20.106  -14.528  -14.407  -14.265  -14.369  -9.091 
  (0.337)  (0.121)  (0.130)  (0.138)  (0.127)  (0.746) 
             
Ln (Size)  0.077          -0.765 
  (0.980)          (0.833) 
             
ModeSale  4.882          4.052 
  (0.381)          (0.504) 
             
MarkAct  1.172          1.122 
  (0.497)          (0.534) 
 
Bonus  -4.353          -4.726 
  (0.581)          (0.570) 
             
EmpContr  8.503  7.887  7.868  7.857  7.896  8.149 
  (0.120)  (0.141)  (0.149)  (0.144)  (0.142)  (0.152) 
             
Non-O/D_w/5%  2.160  2.522  2.535  2.526  2.449  2.050 
  (0.227)  (0.141)  (0.143)  (0.142)  (0.158)  (0.280) 
             
O/D_Oship  -18.654          -19.508 
  (0.279)          (0.278) 
             
ShrhAgt  9.130  6.474  6.453  6.509  6.541  8.858 
  (0.132)  (0.238)  (0.244)  (0.237)  (0.235)  (0.154) 
             
Vol  74.386  73.317  73.468  73.196  73.269  74.547 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
             
Leverage  58.612  61.308  61.177  61.472  61.373  59.466 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002) 
 
IBOthBus(Acquiror)      -0.449      -1.730 
      (0.950)      (0.835) 
 
IBOthBus(Target)      -0.797      0.699 
      (0.912)      (0.928) 
 
Fixed_Pct_ExAnte        -1.444    0.972 
        (0.898)    (0.937) 
             
IBFEE_Res          1.978  0.922 
          (0.758)  (0.890) 
 
PeerBroad            -2.118 
            (0.739) 
             
IB_Rank            -0.273 
            (0.536) 
 
Adj. R-Squared  0.278  0.289  0.280  0.284  0.285  0.253 
No. Obs.  170  170  170  170  170  170 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: ACQPREM is defined as offer price divided by target stock price minus one, using target 
stock price four weeks prior to announcement.  IBFee_Res is the residual from regression (4) in Table [3.2].    32 
  
 
4.  Conclusion 
  Our investigation of investment banking fees for fairness opinions and acquisition 
premia is the first empirical analysis of friendly, two-step, cash acquisitions during our 
period of which we are aware.  Our study is largely descriptive and we do not purport to 
produce a structural estimation of the determinants of investment banking fees or 
acquisition premia.  
Nevertheless, our results are broadly consistent with the predictions of a benign 
view of the role of investment banks in advising acquisition targets.  Fees to banks are 
correlated with attributes of transactions and target firms in ways that make sense if 
banks are being paid for processing information. The more contingent (and, therefore, 
risky) the fees, the higher they tend to be, all else held constant.  Variation in acquisition 
premia also can be explained by fundamental deal attributes.  For example, acquisition 
premia are higher when the target’s leverage and volatility are higher, and (possibly) 
when the acquiror contractually seeks to retain target management. Contrary to the 
jaundiced view of fairness opinions, greater fixity of fees is not associated with higher 
acquisition premia, and there is no evidence that investment banks are suborned by 
acquirors with whom they have had a prior banking relationship.  References 
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